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ABSTRACT 
 
Though, Ipv6 has presented a long list of features that will actually change the entire 
networking environment, it still represents a very small proportion of Internet traffic. One of 
the major reasons behind its partial acceptance is its security, as these features were 
incorporated in Ipv6 just to enhance its overall performance and quality of service, thereby 
neglecting its security part. One such feature is Stateless Address Auto Configuration or 
simply SLAAC, which have undoubtedly reduced a lot of overhead in configuring networks, 
but on the same time it has challenged the security of Ipv6 networks. This research work, 
therefore targets at proposing some security policies to mitigate the risks associated with 
SLAAC, by understanding its working scenario and trying to create the possible attack vector 
to highlight its security concerns. Hence, the implementation of these policies will directly 
add security to networks and make them resistant to SLAAC based attacks. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
Using IPv6 [1], [2], a host machine can 
generate its own IP address, without any 
need for configuration or need of any 
additional address configuring servers. This 
automated process of address generation is 
termed as Stateless Address Auto 
Configuration or simply SLAAC [1], [2], 
[3]. 
 
SLAAC allows host devices within IPv6 
networks to configure its own IP address by 
combining locally available information and 
parameters found in Router Advertisements 
or simply RA’s [4]. IPv6 enabled routers 
advertise information that identify the 
network associated with it, while hosts 
generates a unique interface identifier. A 
combination of both forms an IPv6 address. 
SLAAC therefore has provided a massive 
accountability to routers, which in point of 
fact has given birth to SLAAC-based 
attacks.  
 
Such attacks can involve an attacker to kill 
the default router to introduce a DOS [5] 
factor, or make a fake router to become the 
default router of the network to fetch the 
entire network traffic and introduce MITM 
[6] factor. Further, more complicated 
SLAAC based attacks can involve an 
attacker to forward the fetched traffic to a 
fake DNS [7]. So once the host devices get 
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auto-configured for IP addresses using these 
fake router advertisements, the attacker can 
directly control the network as per his 
malicious intentions.  
 
In this paper, I therefore present the possible 
attack vectors to figure out vulnerabilities in 
SLAAC. By its end, my research work 
concludes by stressing on some security 
policies, which when implemented will 
make networks much more secure and 
resistant to such SLAAC based attacks. 
 
The rest of this research work is organized 
into following sections: Section-2 gives an 
overview of the related work; Section-3 
focuses on the working of SLAAC; Section-
4 highlights the security concerns of 
SLAAC and possible attacks; Section-5 
presents the proposed security policies and 
concludes the research work. 
 
II. RELATED WORK: 
 
The related work to Ipv6-SLAAC can be 
categorized into following 3 categories: a) 
Basics of IPv6 and its features; b) IPv6 
vulnerabilities and its security; c) IPv6 
addressing issues. [20] Microsoft TechNet, 
in 2008, explored IPv6 and its features 
including address auto-configuration. [21] 
Jinesh Doshi, Rachid Chaoua, Saurabh 
Kumar and Sahana Mallya did a 
comparative study of IPv4 and Ipv6 to 
highlight the co-existence in both the 
technologies and the adaptation strategies 
related to it. [22] Shahnawaz Sarwar and 
Aiman Zubair focused on IPv6 addressing 
and IPv6 routing protocols. [23] Harith 
Dawood focused on the security 
vulnerabilities of IPv6. [24] Clinton 
Carpene and Andrew Woodward exposed 
the IPv6-addressing concerns and privacy 
risks associated with them.  
 
Finally I found that the research work has 
been done on IPv6-feature suite and its 
vulnerabilities on a very general ground. 
Individually, much research is not done on 
SLAAC and its security implications. This 
research, in particularly, focus at security 
concerns of SLAAC and propose policies to 
develop a mitigation system against them. 
 
III. SLAAC: 
 
Ipv6 is popular for its numerous benefits to 
end users. Gone are the days of Ipv4, when 
end users needed to configure their 
machines manually or at least configure 
their DHCP [8] server to reduce a bit of 
overhead. Ipv6 has introduced the concept 
of 'hot plugging', which will allow a host to 
configure its Ipv6 address automatically 
once it is connected to a hotspot within a 
network.  
 
This feature is technically known as 
STATELESS ADDRESS AUTO 
CONFIGURATION, and will 
automatically configure host machines with 
a unique IPv6 address, even in the absence 
of DHCPv6 [9].  
 
The process of this address auto 
configuration can be divided into following 
two phases: 
 
PHASE 1: Generation of Link- Local 
Address [10]. 
 
• The host devices initially generate a link 
local address, using which they can 
communicate only within the local 
network.  This link local address is 
generated by combining the interface 
address and link local prefix. 
 
• The moment, a link local address is 
generated, it get verified for its 
uniqueness on the network before it is 
assigned to a host device and used for 
communication. This verification 
process is carried out by the host by 
sending Neighbor Solicitation messages 
containing its link local address. If this 
address is used by another host device 
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on the network, it will send back a 
Neighbor Advertisement for address 
conflict. 
 
• In case there is an address conflict on 
the network, the process of auto 
configuration stops. Now this host can 
be manually configured, or can be 
supplied with another interface identifier 
to continue with address auto 
configuration. 
 
• Once a host device confirms for the 
uniqueness of its link local address on 
the network, it can use this address for 
IP level connectivity within the local 
network only. 
    
PHASE 2: Obtaining Router 
Advertisements and generation of Global 
Address [10]. 
 
• The Ipv6 enabled routers send Router 
Advertisements after every small 
interval of time so that the host device 
could carry out address auto 
configuration without the need to 
contact routers directly. These RA's play 
a vital role in generating a global 
address for a host device that can be 
used globally out of the local network. 
These router advertisements are actually 
accompanied by a series of flags that 
triggers the address auto configuration 
in real sense.  Further it can contain 
other parameters like sub-net prefix, 
lifetime values etc. 
 
• The Autonomous-Address 
Configuration Flag [11] provides 
stateless address auto configuration and 
allows the host device to configure its 
own IPv6 address. As soon as the host 
device receives an RA with 
Autonomous-Address Configuration 
Flag, it triggers the generation of global 
Ipv6 address. 
 
• The Ipv6 Global Address is at last 
generated by combining the unique 
interface identifier and the network/sub-
net prefix provided by RA's. 
 
• Now once the global address is 
generated, it is again checked for its 
uniqueness. Duplicate Address 
Detection or simply DAD [12], is a 
protocol that solves the purpose of 
checking uniqueness of a global address 
assigned to a host device.                                                                   
 
Once DAD flags an Ipv6 Global Address 
with a green signal, the host devices 
associated with this address becomes a part 
of the IP New Generation Protocol. 
 
IV. THE ATTACK VECTORS: 
 
Though SLAAC has automated a part of 
network administration, a gap in its 
adaptation has left the end users prone to 
attacks. Thus, this section, in particularly 
examines this gap to create possible attack 
vectors and figure out the vulnerabilities in 
SLAAC.  
 
There is a possibility that an attacker can 
intercept the communication link between 
the host machines and the default router, 
and then misuse the total automation factor 
in SLAAC. This malicious intention is 
given a real-time effect in terms of 
following steps: 
 
STEP-1:  
 
The attacker, at first tries to intercept the 
actual link between the default router and 
the host machines by altering the Router 
Advertisements of the default router. The 
goal behind altering these RA's is to change 
the router lifetime which defines the time 
limit of concerned router to act as default 
router for that network. But before an 
attacker can alter these RA's, he needs to 
capture these RA's by becoming the part of 
the network.  
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Figure 1: Attacker capturing a valid RA from the default router. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Attacker sending a spoofed RA to host machine to remove its default router. 
 
 
STEP-2: 
 
Now once the attacker is successful in 
capturing valid RA's from a default router, 
by changing the router lifetime available 
these RA's to a value of zero, an attacker is 
easily able to make the host devices to 
remove the default router from its routing 
table as shown in Figure-2. 
 
 
 
STEP-3:  
 
After an attacker has spoofed the valid RA's 
and removed the default router from the 
routing table, it is the right time for him to 
make his final move. Now at this stage an 
attacker can proceed with one of the 
following as per his target and intentions: 
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Figure 3: Attacker sending a fake RA to host machine with changed source address. 
 
 
• SLAAC- BASED DENIAL OF 
SERVICE VECTOR:  
 
Once the attacker is successful to remove 
the default router from the network, the host 
machines will have no default route to 
transfer their packets. It itself is enough to 
mount a DOS attack. Further, an attacker 
can also advertise the address of a non-local 
router or a machine without routing 
capabilities using fake RA's, which will be 
installed as the default gateway for host 
machines once they get configured using 
SLAAC, as shown in Figure-3. Since these 
devices will not be able to route the packets 
to their desired destinations, as they do not 
exist locally or do not have routing 
capability, every request by the host device 
will end up at 'Denial of Services' response 
by the service provider. 
 
• SLAAC- BASED MAN IN THE 
MIDDLE VECTOR:  
 
An attacker can also introduce a fake router 
into the network and make the host 
machines to get auto-configured for 
addresses using RA's sent by this fake 
router. Since the network uses SLAAC for 
address configuration, the total automation 
factor involved in this process will not allow 
the end user to know about the transition in 
the route. Once the host devices get 
configured using fake RA's, the attacker, 
being 'man in the middle' is able to fetch the 
entire traffic to his router and can hamper 
the privacy of data. 
 
• SLAAC- BASED DUAL-STACK 
FAKE ROUTING VECTOR:  
 
This attack actually targets a fully working 
Ipv4 network with IPv4 based router to 
route the packets between the hosts and 
Internet, as shown in Figure-4. Since most 
of the operating systems nowadays have 
Ipv6 enabled by default, they are prone to 
get configured by an IPv6 enabled fake 
router using SLAAC.  
 
Hence, this attack vector can target IPv4 
networks with IPv6- enabled host devices, 
and will involve an attacker to deploy a 
Dual-Stack [13] router with Ipv6 addressing 
interface on the host side to fetch the entire 
traffic.
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Figure 4: Vulnerable IPv4 network, with IPv6 enabled host device. 
 
 
 
Figure 5: Deployment of fake Dual-Stack Router to kill default router. 
 
Since, by default, Ipv6 addressing has a 
higher priority over Ipv4 addressing, the 
dual stack router deployed by the attacker 
will configure the host machines using 
SLAAC and will become the default router 
for the network, as shown in Figure-5. Now 
when an attacker is successful in fetching 
the network traffic to the router deployed by 
him, he can easily route this traffic to any 
spoofed or fake DNS again controlled by 
him using the concept of NAT-PT [14] on 
the fake router.  
 
The above cases directly reflect the 
attacking strategies that can be used to 
exploit the vulnerabilities in SLAAC. These 
attack vectors can prove to be highly risky 
for both IPv4 as well as Ipv6 based 
networks, as SLAAC itself do not provide 
any monitoring or mitigating system against 
such attacks  
 
V. SECURITY CONCERNS OF 
SLAAC: 
 
As noted in the previous sections, SLAAC 
largely depends on routers in the process of 
address auto configuration. Since routers are 
entirely the care takers of address 
assignments under Ipv6 SLAAC, and 
perform IP based authentication by itself, an 
attacker can easily spoof a trusted router or 
even place a fake router to fetch the entire 
network traffic and employ any of the attack 
vectors discussed before. The following 
point’s highlights the concerns associated 
with this huge accountability provided to 
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routers in SLAAC and how these concerns 
can be used by an attacker to target the 
security of networks. 
 
• Using the SLAAC mechanism, routers 
initiate the process of address auto 
configuration by sending routing 
information as a part of RA's. These 
RA's are directly received and processed 
by host machines without any checks to 
get an IPv6 addresses.  But fake or 
bogus routing information sent through 
RA's can substantiate an attacker to 
request a connection to host machines 
and capture their traffic.  
 
• Since SLAAC involves RA's to 
communicate the subnet prefix/ subnet 
masks to host machines, a massive DOS 
attack can be launched by 
communicating the fake subnet masks to 
host machines. Since a host machine 
will have to reply for every received 
RA, no matter whether it was requested 
or not, a chain of such fake RA's can 
easily lead to a network crash. 
  
• Under SLAAC, interface identifiers 
remains unchanged regardless of the 
network they are associated with. It is so 
because SLAAC, by default, uses the 
MAC address as the interface identifier 
[15]. This directly exposes the host 
machines to the attacker if he can fetch 
the entire traffic of the network to a 
router under his control. This might 
likewise imply that the host machines 
are vulnerable against device tracking 
and additionally simple targets for 
attacks from anyplace as far and wide as 
possible. Hence SLAAC, in other words 
compromise device privacy on the 
network. 
 
The above concerns clearly highlight the 
fact that the use of SLAAC can possibly 
lead to service delays, connection drops and 
eavesdropping.  
 
VI. SECURITY POLICIES: 
 
As clear from above section, SLAAC can be 
a huge risk once the host machines get 
configured by a malicious router and this 
can directly target privacy and security of 
data on the network. Hence it is very 
important to cover the gap in adaptation of 
SLAAC to ensure security of networks. The 
following security policies can play a vital 
role in diminishing the risks associated with 
SLAAC based attacks, thereby making 
SLAAC a much more powerful and secure 
feature of IP Next Generation Protocol. 
Such policies will help to identify malicious 
Router Advertisements [16], as well as will 
rapidly recover from a state where host 
machines have already configured using 
such a fake RA. 
 
• DISABLE IPv6 ADDRESSING 
SCHEME IN IPv4 NETWORKS: 
 
Most of the operating systems today support 
Ipv6 addressing scheme and have Ipv6 
enabled by default. This can invite attackers 
to take advantage of such vulnerable host 
devices through the dual-stack fake routing 
attack discussed in Section-4. 
 
It is recommended to disable IPv6 
addressing, since it has no role to play in 
IPv4 networks. 
 
• BLOCK FAKE ROUTER 
ADVERTISEMENTS:  
 
If router advertisements initiated from 
unknown sources can be blocked, killing or 
replacing the default router in the network 
will become almost impossible, and hence 
the network can easily be secured from 
SLAAC based attacks. Usually the first hop 
for host devices on a network is a switch; 
therefore by implementing the right set of 
security features on layer-2 itself, we can 
block fake RA's. Many good tools are 
available that work on Layer 2 managed 
switches. RA Guard [17] is one such tool 
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that monitors Router Advertisements and 
block unknown or fake RA's. Another way 
to block fake RA's is to introduce the 
concept of Access Control Lists once 
default routers of the network are defined. 
Using ACL's, only known RA's are allowed 
to user ports and others can be dropped if 
they are known to be originated from fake 
or unknown routers.  
 
 
• USE OF SLAAC IN 
SYNCHRONIZATION WITH SE-ND:  
 
Under Ipv6, host machines uses Neighbor 
Discovery Protocol [18] (NDP) for various 
purposes such as to discover neighboring 
host machines and routers. Secure Neighbor 
Discovery or simply Se-ND [18] is the 
advanced version of NDP that has patched 
the existing security related flaws in it. Se-
ND is a powerful protocol that uses various 
features to ensure that security of a network 
is not compromised in anyway. Certification 
Paths and Cryptographically Generated 
Addresses are two main features of Se-ND, 
that ensure authenticity of devices, both the 
hosts as well as the routers, on the network. 
So a network architecture that uses SLAAC 
synchronized with Se-ND protocol can 
possibly ensure that host machines get 
configured for addresses using known 
native routers. Further this practice can even 
restrict untrusted host devices to connect to 
the network and cause malicious functions 
 
• LEGITIMATE ROUTERS SHOULD 
BE TAGGED WITH HIGH 
PREFERENCE:  
 
Router preference allows routers to be 
classified into three levels:  Low, Medium 
and High. If known and trusted routers can 
be tagged with high preference, this could 
suffice to alleviate fake Router 
Advertisements that were transmitted. For 
example, Windows Internet Connection 
Sharing uses Router Preference option to 
select the router, so if legitimate routers are 
given high-level of preference, it will be 
their RA's that will be utilized to proceed for 
SLAAC. So Router Preference policy might 
be utilized to recognize legitimate routers 
and hence can act as a mitigation system 
against the fake routers. 
 
• IMPLEMENT ‘2-HOUR RULE’ [19] 
TO RECOVER AFTER 
PROCESSING A FAKE RA:  
 
Once a host device processes a fake RA, it 
may reach to a conflicting state because of 
configuring multiple gateways or global 
addresses. This is the right time when the 
network administrators should get active 
and implement ‘2-hour Rule’ proposed in 
RFC 4862- Section 5.3.3. This policy will 
help to recover from this critical stage. 
 
VII. CONCLUSION: 
 
Besides its numerous useful features, 
organizations and individual users, 
somewhere lack the trust to use IPv6. The 
major reason behind this hesitation is the 
security of IPv6, which is not yet matured 
enough to shield networks from attacks.  
Hence there is a need to scrutinize the 
individual features of IPv6, in order to 
understand the risks associated with them 
and develop mitigating systems accordingly. 
This research work was targeted to explore 
SLAAC in order to find out the existing 
vulnerabilities in it and frame out certain 
security policies that can actually secure the 
networks that use the concept of address 
auto-configuration. The proposed security 
policies will diminish the risks associated 
with the Denial of Service, Man in the 
Middle and Dual-Stack Rouge Routing 
variants of SLAAC- based attacks and 
hence directly enhance the security of 
networks.  
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